22/1/2014 維權消息: 新公民運動許志永案開庭,梁小軍律師等百名聲援者被帶走。呼籲釋放晨鐘書局總編輯姚文田

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新公民運動案陸續受審

22/1/2014 [紐約時報NYT] 新公民運動七成員今日起陸續受審

人權宣導者以及法學院講師滕彪認識被告中的多位元,他說,這種紮堆審理,是習近平主席的政府向那些支持限制共產黨權力的人發出的警告,審理的結果幾乎可以肯定是被告有罪、並將獲刑。滕彪在一次採訪中說,“他們很可能會被判一到兩年的徒刑,許志永最高可能會被判5年。政府現在這麼猛烈地反擊,是因為習近平認為,如果不堅決壓制這些維權運動,將來他會面臨更大的麻煩。”

以下是其他幾名將在本周受審者的名單,以及對他們的指控,資訊來自對被告律師的電話採訪、以及被告律師和支持者在網上公佈的訴訟檔:

趙常青,44歲,將於週四在北京市海澱區一家法院受審。和許志永以及其他在本周受審的活動人士一樣,對他的起訴也是“聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序罪”。趙常青曾在1989年參加學生運動,從那以後他一直宣導民主改革。2003年,他因“煽動顛覆罪”被判刑五年。這次對趙常青的起訴稱,他去年曾多次參加抗議活動,抗議在去年3月31日達到高潮,當時在北京繁華的購物區西單發生了一場小規模、但情緒激昂的要求官員公開財產的活動。他的律師張雪忠說曾申請推遲審理,因為雙方對證據和程式意見不一致,但遭到了拒絕。

丁家喜和李蔚
這兩位男子也參加了在西單舉行的抗議,一些新公民運動的支持者稱那場抗議活動似乎引發了政府採取措施鎮壓公民運動。丁家喜,46歲,職業律師;李蔚,42歲,無固定工作;他們將在週五在海澱區的一家法院一起受審,罪名是“聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序”。
起訴書稱,他們夥同其他活動人士,“利用‘官員財產公示’話題,組織、策劃多人在公共場所聚集並實施張打橫幅、發放傳單等行為。”丁家喜的律師王興說,他和其他被告人的辯護律師已提出延期審理的申請,因為其中兩位律師要出席其他審理,屆時無法出庭,但尚未得到法院的答覆。

張寶成和袁冬週五將在海澱區的另一個法院另行接受審理,起訴他們的罪名也是聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序,也是因為他們在去年早些時候參加了幾次抗議活動,其中包括去年3月31日的西單抗議。張寶成,54歲,股票投資公司經理,袁冬,46歲,無固定工作,他們被指控在2013年的頭三個月裡參加了三次抗議活動。

起訴書稱,他們“發放橫幅、散發傳單,並在現場持擴音器演講”。張寶成的律師陳建剛說,他和其他辯護律師都曾申請推遲審理,因為他和另一名律師因時間衝突無法出庭。

 

劉遠東,35歲,將於週五在廣東省廣州市天河區人民法院受審。他的律師劉正清說,對他的指控是擾亂公共場所秩序,以及另一條指控:他為自己成立的生物技術公司謊報註冊資金金額。起訴書稱,2013年1月,商人劉遠東用舉牌、演講方式聚眾擾亂了公共場所秩序。劉遠東的律師劉正清說,他沒有申請延期審理。

 

[推特消息]

江天勇:1)在公檢法已公然實質性違法的情況下,公正審判已被表明是不可能的,如此,普通的辯護只能使得被告人、尤其是辯護人成為當局非法審判的道具。2)無論怎麼辯護,結果早已經寫好。3)此種無聲的辯護,一切盡在不言之中。4)這種沉默以對,會使得大家都去追問此案來龍去脈,效果實際上更好。

RT @tengbiao:  【兩博士將以沉默抗議不公義的法庭】張慶芳,許案辯護律師,刑法學博士。他尊重許博士意見將以拒絕法庭調查,拒絕質證,放棄法庭辯論的方式,無聲抗議北京第一中級法院這個不公義的法庭。一上午的庭審,許志永、張慶方律師、楊金柱律師都保持沉默。在此特定情境下,沉默比辯論更有震撼的力量。按照我的理解,許志永在法庭“保持沉默”,包括法庭調查、質證、辯論階段,但未必包括“最後陳述”階段。許博士也許不會放棄這次表達其理念的機會。

葛文秀律師;“對許志永博士的審判,是一場對公民權利的審判,是對憲法秩序的踐踏,是一股精心策劃的反法治逆流,面對這種不法起訴和不公義的法庭,沉默是唯一選擇,也是最後的抵抗。”

張雪忠:剛接到趙*常*青妻子的電話,稱她出門後一直被幾名不明身份的男子跟蹤。我想對北京市公安局的各位領導說:在趙先生被抓捕後,他的妻子一直都低調、平靜地獨自撫育孩子,你們政治迫害趙先生也就罷了,為什麼還要騷擾他的妻兒?你們還是人生人養的嗎?

22/1/2014 [SKY] Amnesty Fears Over Trial Of Chinese Lawyer

Human rights campaigners say Xu Zhiyong is a “prisoner of conscience” and should be released immediately and unconditionally.

22/1/2014 [民生觀察] 新公民運動許志永案開庭 大量圍觀聲援人員被抓(滾動)

彭中林、吳玉芬、鄭培培等二十多維權上訪人剛剛一靠近北京中院,即被員警抓了,現正在警車上,不知送往何處。

在京維權人士、遼寧馬三家教養院受害者劉華今天早上七點被右安門派出所帶走。劉華丈夫告訴本工作室說,劉華昨天表示要圍觀許志永案。

唐荊陵律師22日9點40分發來消息稱:武漢維權人士陳豔琳、吳玉芬和其它訪民在許志永法庭外被抓了 ,現在帶到北京石景山派出所。

北京活躍維權人士天李英之、李學會等接連被上崗。李英之發來微信稱:先前我下樓,發現我的確是被上崗了,蹲守的維穩人員說不讓我去法庭圍觀,我本想明早(22日)很早就出門去圍觀許志永案,但現在看來他們要徹夜蹲守我了 。

剛才北京大學陳兆志老師,因許志勇、侯欣等訴訟被員警上崗。

中午,本工作室北京志願者又收到消息:河北定州劉敏傑、遼寧的盛蘭福、濟南的於新永在北京中院旁被抓走。隨後,又傳來遼寧姜家文被抓的消息。

田蘭、周曆、徐兆傑等申冤員警今天上午也到場圍觀了許志永案,並突破封鎖線接收了媒體採訪。

22/1/2014 [民生觀察] 停止政治迫害,保障基本人–民生觀察關於許志永等新公民運動參與者受審的聲明

從1月22日開始到1月24日,被控“聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序”的許志永、丁家喜、趙常青、馬新立、侯欣、袁冬、張寶成、李蔚等八位新公民運動宣導者和參與者將在北京的法院受審。民生觀察嚴重關切許志永等八位因爭取基本公民權利而受審的公民,以及去年12月在江西新餘受審的劉萍、魏忠平、李思華和此前遭到關押的王功權、李化平、劉遠東等新公民運動積極參與者,呼籲當局立即無條件釋放這些遭到逮捕、關押、審判的公民,恢復他們的人身自由、言論自由等基本公民權利。 22/1/2014 [維權網] 維權人士陳雲飛在北京中院前與許多訪民被抓走

今天(元月22日)是新公民運動宣導者許志永被控“聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序罪”在北京市第一中級法院開庭的日子,四川民主維權人士 陳雲飛前往中院準備申請旁聽,結果在中院附近被守候的大批員警抓走,還有大批趕來準備聲援許志永的訪民也被抓上停靠在中院附近的車上,預計準備送往專門關押訪民的久敬莊“黑監獄”關押。

22/1/2014 [維權網] 於豔華因聲援、欲參加“新公民運動”成員庭審,被員警砸門斷網(圖)

1月22日淩晨,暫住在北京的江蘇維權人士于豔華突遭員警砸門,隨後寬頻網路被切斷。至本網發稿時止,於豔華的家中不僅斷網,電也被切斷,樓下有警車,家門外有數名員警仍在敲門和蹲守。

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 聲援許志永,在京維權人士提前預熱

(2014/1/21)權利運動發佈:明天就是新公民運動發起人許志永先生被以“擾序”構陷一案開庭審理的日子,為防司法流氓剝奪民眾的旁聽權,今天由上海的吳玉芬、虞春香、韋開珍、鄭培培、劉永鳳、湖北的李樹南、江蘇的沈立秀、於豔華、內蒙的楊金芝、河北的劉小軍、遼寧的王作香、以及連續兩次遭豐台區公安分局刑拘、並剛剛獲得無罪釋放的姜家文先生等人,到石景山區的北京市第一中級法院門前,以拉橫幅的表達方式提前為許志永先生聲援,要求當局無條件釋放所有新公民運動成員。當局所謂許志永先生“擾序”一案,其實就是通過理性的新公民運動方式,向當局提出“教育平權”的全體國民要求,以及要求中共官員按照現代政治文明的要求公示財產,且在表達方式上沒有任何擾亂秩序的行為。

22/1/2014 [維權網] 許志永案庭審現場封路,梁小軍律師等百名聲援者被帶走(圖)

今天(1月22日)上午許志永被控聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序罪一案在北京市第一中級法院開庭,在前往一中院的八寶山地鐵各出口,有眾多嚴陣以待的員警和便衣在監控,前往法庭的道路被交通管制,梁小軍律師、維權人士陳雲飛等近百名到現場關注的人士被員警帶走。

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 法庭內秘密審判,法庭外恐怖綁架

今天是新公民運動發起人許志永被構陷案的公開審理的日子。來自北京的消息,沒有一個真正的公民被當局允許進入法庭旁聽,整個北京市第一中級法院周邊的路口被嚴密封鎖,凡是到現場要求旁聽或聲援的人統統被早已埋伏與此的員警兩個架一個綁走。據悉,還有一部分在京訪民在今天淩晨就在住處遭到清剿與非法拘禁。

22/1/2014 [美國之音VOA] 快訊:許志永案北京開庭 有聲援者被抓

中國新公民運動宣導者許志永博士被控“聚眾擾亂公共場所秩序”一案1月22日在北京市第一中級法院開庭。有消息說,當局在法院周圍部署了不少員警,一些聲援者到法院外面,圍觀者據說有上百人,但有人被抓。上午11點左右,維權律師梁小軍被在法院附近被員警帶走。當時,已有多家國際媒體記者在現場採訪。四川民主維權人士陳雲飛早晨8點多前往該法院準備申請旁聽,但在法院附近被員警抓走,還有一些前去聲援許志永的訪民也被抓到附近車上,送往不明地點。

22/1/2014 [美國之音VOA] 幾名維權人士面臨審判 習近平政府改革承諾受考驗

幾十名新公民運動的成員因嘗試行使結社集會權和言論自由權而在去年被拘捕。中國維權人士說,60多人跟新公民運動有關聯,這項運動宣導社會公正、向善和公民參與。維權律師陳建剛是定於星期五受審的另外兩位新公民運動成員的辯護律師。他說,他的當事人精神狀態不錯,不過,從他們當初被拘捕那一刻,審判的結果就已經定論了。他說:“因為這種結果不是通過審理得到的,是在審理之前有權力機構或者個別大佬都已經做好決定了。判決書基本上都已經寫好了。”

22/1/2014 [美國之音VOA] 人權組織呼籲中國釋放許志永

許志永發起的“新公民運動”宣導在體制內推動變革,認為民主法制才是解決中國諸多問題之道。去年8月,他在北京一個拘留中心重申了新公民運動的訴求:“宣導大家做公民,堂堂正正地做公民,享受憲法規定的公民權利,履行公民責任。”去年3、4月間,在許志永的鼓勵 下,數十人在中國各地展開橫幅,要求官員公佈財產。許志永和他的新公民運動顯然為中國政府所不容,有關當局對新公民運動進行了為期10個月的打壓,許志永則被以“聚眾擾亂公共秩序”的罪名逮捕和審判。

22/1/2014 [法廣RFI] 人權觀察:中國未能回應民意啟動真政改

人權觀察的亞洲主任亞當斯(Brad Adams)在聲明中說:「為回應內部和國際壓力,中國政府對廢除勞教和一胎化政策宣示了部分改革措施。但領導階層也對異議人士展開嚴厲鎮壓,同時以強硬的措辭表明,他們無意推動政治體系自由化。」人權觀察在年度報告中說,大陸尚未「啟動徹底改革,以充分回應大眾對正義和負責任日益提高的要求」。人權觀察說,特別令人憂心的是,中國當局逮捕要求官員公佈財產的人士。

22/1/2014 [法廣RFI] 大赦國際:北京一邊喊反腐一邊審判反腐人士很虛偽

大赦國際組織今天發佈公報,譴責中國政府在反腐行動中,一方面承諾保持“透明”的意願,另一方面卻以“擾亂公共秩序”的名義審判反腐人士的“虛偽”行為。

22/1/2014 [參與] 藺其磊:趙常青案庭前會議簡報(圖)

2014年1月20日上午九點半,趙常青案庭前會議在北京市海澱區人民法院舉行。會上,辯護人提出兩個極為重要的程式問題:

第一,從起訴書的內容來看,公訴機關認為,許志永、趙常青、丁家喜、李蔚、袁冬、張寶成、侯欣等人的行為屬於共同犯罪。由於北京市第一中級人民法院已經受理了許志永的案件,趙常青案亦應由北京市第一中級人民法院管轄。因為,《最高人民法院關於適用<中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法>若干問題的解釋》第13條明確規定:“一人犯數罪、共同犯罪和其他需要併案審理的案件,其中一人或者一罪屬於上級人民法院管轄的,全案由上級人民法院管轄”。根據上述規定,共同犯罪屬於“需要併案審理”的案件,只要一人由上級人民法院管轄,全案均應由上級人民法院管轄。因此,辯護人要求海澱區人民法院將趙常青案移送至北京市第一中級人民法院審判。

第二、在海澱區人民法院受理趙常青案後,我們曾多次要求複製案件的視頻證據,並一再向法院申明,在審判階段複製包括視頻證據在內的全部證據材料,是辯護律師的法定權利;法院只許律師在指定時間到法院觀看,卻不許律師依法複製的做法,既是對被告人辯護權的非法剝奪,也是對法律的公然踐踏。刑事訴訟法第38條明確規定,“辯護律師自人民檢察院對案件審查起訴之日起,可以查閱、摘抄、複製本案的案卷材料”。法律賦予辯護律師複製案卷材料的權利,是為了保障辯護律師可以隨時和反復審閱、研判案件的證據,以便為被告人進行充分和有效的辯護。由於法院非法剝奪辯護人的證據複製權,辯護人至今仍未獲取本案的全部證據,根本無法為被告人進行有效的辯護。因此,辯護人再次要求複製本案的視頻證據,並申請將本案的開庭時間延遲至15天之後進行。

對於辯護人上述兩點意見,合議庭均拒絕採納。合議庭這種罔顧法律的做法,令辯護人深感錯愕。

另外,辯護人還提出了下列三點意見:

(1)海澱區人民檢察院在受理案件一周後,即將案件匆匆起訴至法院,既未給律師查閱和複製案卷的機會,也未聽取辯護人的意見,完全違反了法律的明確規定,辯護人曾就此代表當事人對三位公訴人提出控告。由於三位公訴人已經成為當事人和辯護人的控告對象,雙方存在著可能影響案件公正處理的利害關係,因此辯護人要求三位公訴人回避。公訴人稱,此一回避申請需由其所在檢察院審查後予以答覆。

(2)辯護人要求法院嚴格貫徹公開審判的原則,允許媒體和公眾旁聽案件的庭審,不要安排內部人士佔據旁聽席位,對案件進行變相的秘密審判。

(3)趙常青本人參加了此次庭前會議。庭前會議一開始,辯護人首先便要求法院貫徹刑訴法的無罪推定和保障人權的原則,為當事人去除刑具。合議庭採納了辯護人的此一意見,指示法警去除了當事人的刑具。

簡報人: 藺其磊(趙常青的辯護人) 張雪忠(趙常青的辯護人)2014年1月20日

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] “國際特赦”組織聲明:習近平“虛偽”反腐

“國際特赦”組織在中國法庭即將審理許志永案的前夕,以《中國:虛偽的反腐及對反腐活動人士的打壓》為題,批評中國當局對“新公民運動”成員的審判,凸顯習近平維護執政特權、打擊異議人士,是“虛偽”的反腐。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 許志永、丁家喜分別見律師 決在庭上沉默表達抗議

涉及此案的還包括北京律師丁家喜、李蔚,他們被控與許志永相同的罪名,將於本週五在海澱區法院受審。丁家喜的代理律師程海週二見到了當事人,並參加法院召開的庭前會議。他說,在庭前會議提出了五、六點要求,但未被採納:“第一個是公訴人出庭是違法的, 他 不具有資格,按照刑訴法和最高檢察院規定,公訴人必須是檢察長或者是檢察員、助理檢察官,他們這三個人,一個叫張偉(音),一個叫周建輝、另一個叫趙鵬, 屬於一分檢的(北京市檢察院一分院)處長,他們以代理檢察員的身份,因為法律上沒有規定這個職務,所以我們認為他們不具備這個資格。我認為他們是私訴人,不是公訴人,要求他們退庭,法院沒有同意”。

22/1/2014 [北風] 許志永案開庭法院外照片匯總

【孔傑榮教授文章全文】

Struggling for Justice: China’s Courts and the Challenge of Reform

China’s new leaders are striving to consolidate their country’s return to prominence on the world stage. They confront Promethean challenges: restructuring a dynamic economy; responding to the demands of an increasingly prosperous and sophisticated society; controlling horrendous environmental pollution; liberating the cultural, civic, academic and intellectual potential of their talented people; reducing the endemic corruption that is undermining their success; adapting the Communist political system to promote these prodigious changes while balancing the needs of public order and human rights; and improving cooperation with other countries by enhancing foreign respect for China’s accomplishments.

Courts, or some effective functional substitute, are essential for the attainment of all these goals. Yet China’s judicial system is in the midst of a crucial struggle to determine its nature, role and power.

China’s new leaders are making bold policy statements promoting the notion that, in their decision-making, Chinese courts should exercise greater independence from local authorities and other distorting influences. They have announced a series of new measures and experiments designed to increase the legitimacy of the judicial process and garner greater public support for it. These reforms face serious challenges, but the current attempt to chart a new course deserves our attention, study and encouragement.

Background

First, some language clarifications. Foreign observers frequently misunderstand the Chinese Communist Party’s use of the term “judicial system,” which includes not only the courts but also the police as well as the procuracy (prosecution). Meanwhile, the contemporary Chinese terms “shenpan yuan” and “faguan” are usually rendered as “judge” in English, instead of their more literal translation as “adjudication person” and “legal official.” The word “judge” implicitly evokes the image of a Western-style judge. Although it has been more than a decade since a reformist Chinese chief justice ordered his colleagues to don black robes instead of their previous military-type garb, anyone familiar with their operations knows that these adjudicators lead different professional lives from their Western counterparts.

Chinese courts report to the nominally all-powerful National People’s Congress (NPC). Although the nation’s judiciary is formally separate from the executive branch as well as the procuracy, the status of judges is not very different from that of other members of a vast government bureaucracy, and they are subject to a detailed, rather mechanical system—analogous to the general cadre evaluation system—for evaluating their performance. Yet they are gradually becoming professionally more distinctive.

China’s courts are increasingly staffed by personnel who have received formal legal education at undergraduate or graduate university levels as well as at a national judicial college. While emphasizing “socialist law with Chinese characteristics,” their studies have generally inspired respect for continental European civil law and Anglo-American common law models. This is a major change from earlier decades when, even after the post-Cultural Revolution re-establishment of the courts in the late 1970s, most judges continued to be recruited from the army or the police. Nonetheless, some Chinese scholars contend that, particularly in the rural areas that are still home to more than half the country’s population, the basic courts would be better served by judges who had less legal education but more real-life experience than recent young recruits, who know only law on the books and lead a sheltered existence.

Although judges generally must now pass a national civil service examination as well as a national judicial examination, they are hired not by a central judicial office but by local courts, usually with the approval of the court’s Communist Party political department. Most are, or soon become, party members and therefore subject to the discipline of the party organizations within and outside the court as well as the discipline of the judicial hierarchy. One of the central facts about China’s judicial bureaucracy is that it is intimately intertwined with the party bureaucracy, as we shall see. Another crucial factor is that the courts have largely been financed from local government sources rather than from central or provincial coffers, which stimulates their responsiveness to local pressures.

After a period of apprenticeship, Chinese judges are assigned to one of the specialized court divisions dealing with criminal, civil, administrative and other types of cases. Except in matters of minor importance, they normally operate in panels of three. There is a two-tier adjudication arrangement. Most cases tried in the first instance court are handled by a single professional judge sitting with two “people’s assessors” selected from a roster of approved laymen available to give proceedings the appearance of popular democracy. In practice, assessors ordinarily take their cues from the judge in charge. Decision-making on appeals to the second instance tribunal is usually dealt with by a collegiate panel of three career judges.

Yet some sensitive cases are never accepted for court deliberation. Under instruction from central, provincial or local authorities from the party, government or court, a court’s case reception division may simply refuse to inscribe a civil or administrative law complaint without offering adequate reasons. Even commercial cases as well as challenges to the regulations and actions of administrative agencies are sometimes rejected, creating extreme frustration among individuals and groups seeking judicial remedies for their economic, social and political grievances. Before he was imprisoned and later released to study in the United States, Chen Guangcheng, the blind legal activist, was frequently rebuffed in his efforts to use the courts to remedy injustice, whether the case involved illegal taxation, unfair denial of a business license or unlawfully coerced abortion or sterilization. “What do they want me to do?” he once asked me. “Go into the streets? I don’t want to do that.”

Nevertheless, China’s courts are overrun with civil cases, despite periodic nationwide campaigns to settle disputes through pretrial judicial mediation as well as popular mediation institutions outside the courts. Government-established arbitration commissions also relieve the courts of many disputes. Yet in 2012, the most recent year for which statistics are available, more than 12 million trial and appellate cases were before the courts, more than China’s roughly 200,000 judges can comfortably handle. In that year they had to cope with more than 6.6 million new civil cases, 136,000 new administrative law challenges and 840,000 new criminal cases.

In these circumstances, trial court hearings have generally been brief and more often focused on documents, including transcribed pretrial witness statements, than on live testimony—except from the parties to the dispute—but a new civil procedure law emphasizes witness appearances in court. China now has more than 220,000 lawyers available to represent the parties and aid the courts. Because of the greater opportunities for earning income, their presence is more apparent in civil and administrative matters than in criminal cases, where most defendants still are unrepresented.

The judicial activities of lawyers are restricted in many ways. To an American observer, the most striking limitation on Chinese lawyers is an inability to invoke constitutional protections before the courts. Despite a brief flurry of uncertainty a decade ago, Chinese courts are now plainly prohibited from deciding constitutional issues. Those issues are the exclusive province of the NPC Standing Committee, which has proved adept at avoiding them.

The trial of criminal cases is especially problematic. Many uncontested prosecutions are disposed of through simplified procedures that do not guarantee an uneducated defendant’s comprehension of the charges and choices confronting him. When lawyers do take part in criminal trials, their opportunities to demonstrate their skills are often limited, despite legislative amendments designed to aid their performance. Whether new procedural reforms will be more successful than previous ones in securing the appearance of witnesses in court—witnesses appear in fewer than 5 percent of prosecutions—has yet to be proved. Requiring witnesses to come to court and be subject to questioning and cross-examination will be a major test of judicial power. Getting policemen to submit to cross-examination in response to defense claims that they used torture to obtain confessions will be a particularly significant challenge.

One of the most controversial aspects of Chinese trials is that, in cases of any sensitivity, whether criminal, civil or administrative, the judicial panel that tries the case does not decide it. Generally, the division chief or his assistant, after the routine review they accord every proposed decision, will pass difficult or sensitive cases to the court chief or one of his deputies, usually for approval by the court’s “adjudication committee” comprising the court leadership. This group, after merely hearing a trial panel’s summary and recommendation, then makes the decision under the guidance of the court’s chief judge.

The decisions of judges and the adjudication committee are often influenced by a range of factors in addition to those intrinsic to the legal merits of a case. The protection of local interests may be crucial to the resolution of a business dispute between a local company or person and those from elsewhere in China or abroad. Judicial corruption is frequently a major factor, even in criminal cases. “Guanxi,” the network of personal relations that judges sometimes find more compelling than legal norms, may prove even harder to detect and eradicate. In criminal and certain other cases, ever-present in the judicial mind is the need to “maintain social stability,” that is, to take account of public opinion in cases that attract popular attention, even if that requires misapplication of substantive or procedural law. A court may also yield to the blandishments of an influential or aggressive litigant who otherwise threatens to petition against its decision all the way to Beijing.

Judges may be informally bombarded from many sources, including local government or party officials; members of the local people’s congress, which, in addition to the procuracy, is supposed to supervise the work of the local courts; members of the local people’s consultative conference or other prominent residents; judges from a higher court; and individual provincial or central party or government leaders.

This puts judges, who do not enjoy life tenure or long-term job security, under considerable pressure. The Chinese Constitution purports to guarantee courts as an institution with the right and obligation to carry out their duties independently, but no legal provision protects the independence of an individual judge. Moreover, despite the constitutional protection of the courts’ independence, there is no clear understanding of the meaning of that protection, and the party maintains a formal system of external control over judicial decision-making by means of a local party political-legal committee (LPLC). The committee decides the outcome of important cases for the courts at its level of the party-state organization as part of its responsibilities for overall “coordination” of all local “judicial institutions,” including the police, procuracy, justice bureau and court. Any doubts that a court may have about the needs of “social stability” are resolved by the LPLC.

The leaders of each of the local legal institutions take part in the LPLC. That committee was generally headed by the local police chief, whose government rank is inferior to that of some other committee members but who outranks them in the party hierarchy. Recently, however, as part of a new, ongoing central effort to improve the administration of justice, leadership of the LPLC reportedly has generally been given to a deputy party secretary of the overall party committee responsible for the locality. The new reform spirit has also reportedly begun to cut back or perhaps even eliminate the power of the LPLC to decide concrete cases, restricting its purview to more general matters such as policy issues, personnel appointments, promotions and removals, and other administrative issues.

These changes have been fueled by growing popular dissatisfaction with the perceived unfairness of the country’s courts and with the party’s responsibility for it. A spate of embarrassing, highly publicized wrongful criminal convictions has spurred a nationwide sense of injustice, and this brings us to the current ferment over the judicial process.

The Current Struggle

In November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th National Congress introduced a new elite to govern the country for the next 10 years under the leadership of party General Secretary, and soon to be President, Xi Jinping. Among the confusing welter of subsequent developments, three trends appear to have emerged relating to law, justice and the courts.

First, repression of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of expression has become even harsher than under the previous administration led by Hu Jintao, with the courts as well as the police and procuracy serving as the evident tools of the party’s new elite. Almost daily accounts on the Internet and in social media report examples of arbitrary conviction of nongovernmental reformers, human rights proponents, political dissidents, religious figures, minority protesters and other activists, as well as gross mistreatment of the accused and their would-be lawyers, witnesses, families and supporters, both inside and outside the courtroom.

Second, legislation relating to criminal justice has, by and large, nevertheless continued to improve. One of the earliest acts of the new administration was to endorse and promulgate a substantially amended criminal procedure law that, as already indicated, in many respects promises increased fairness in the court system. At its most recent meeting, the NPC Standing Committee finally abolished the pernicious system of “re-education through labor,” the most infamous of several supposedly “noncriminal” administrative punishments that have undermined the power of the courts by authorizing the police to condemn people to detention in a labor camp without necessary judicial involvement. As Zhou Qiang, China’s newly appointed chief justice, alerted the courts last fall, one of the immediate consequences of this legislated progress toward the rule of law would in all likelihood be a very significant increase in court burdens, since many cases formerly disposed of through “re-education through labor” would soon be prosecuted as minor crimes and require court approval.

The third trend is the most interesting for our purposes. It is the recent effort of high-level law reformers within the party as well as the judiciary to transform relevant party and government ideology, policy and disciplinary systems in ways that will reduce the huge existing gap between repressive practice and enlightened legislation in the administration of criminal justice. This effort is centered in the new leadership of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) headed by Zhou, who, unlike his predecessors, combines high-ranking status within the party with impressive legal skills and a zest for reform.

Zhou and his colleague, Deputy Chief Justice Shen Deyong, are obviously seeking to rescue the traditionally poor reputation of the national court system. The credibility of the courts has recently been further damaged by, among other things, the many recently publicized wrongful convictions. Even Xi and his choice to head the party’s Central Political-Legal Commission, former Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu, have publicly and repeatedly recognized the urgent need to instill popular confidence in the courts.

Indeed, in January 2013 they initiated the current campaign to bolster the courts, and in late February Xi delivered a speech to a study session of the party Politburo devoted to problems of the rule of law. Xi urged the judicial organs to cope with “the deep issues that interfere with judicial justice and restrain judicial capacity.” The courts and the procuracy must be allowed to carry out adjudication and prosecution independently and impartially, he stated, and he made clear that this would require restraint on party organizations at all levels, which “must act within the boundaries of the constitution and the laws.”

Xi’s remarks opened the way for a series of speeches by Zhou and Shen during the spring and summer that focused on correcting and preventing wrongful convictions. In May, in a long article published in the SPC’s newspaper that elaborated on his speeches, Shen boldly set forth both the spirit and detailed prescriptions of the new campaign. In addition to stressing the importance of judges and their commitment to professional standards, Shen wrote that China must abandon the presumption of guilt that infects practice. “We would rather wrongfully release a person than wrongfully convict someone,” he added. The presumption of innocence, he stated, forbids convicting an accused where the evidence is insufficient and then giving him a less severe punishment as a kind of compromise, a practice that I have personally encountered in advising in Chinese human rights cases.

Shen emphasized the value of judges complying with legal procedures, especially the presumption of innocence, and applying science and technology to evidence in order to avoid unjust outcomes. “From the perspective of preventing wrongful conviction,” he stated, “defense lawyers are the most trustworthy and reliable force” and their legal rights must be respected. Shen frankly admitted that injustices often resulted from Chinese courts taking orders from outside sources, abandoning their principles or being sloppy in their work.

Not long after Shen’s essay, the Ministry of Public Security announced its support for the campaign. Then in July, the Central Party Political-Legal Commission (CPLC) issued its stunning “Provisions on Earnest Prevention of Miscarriage of Justice,” one of the most important official human rights documents to appear in China in recent years.

With none of the ideological cliches that too often mark party and legal documents, the provisions, after a brief confirmation that they are based on the instructions of Xi Jinping and the CPLC leadership, set forth the goal of preventing miscarriages of justice through “strict adherence to legal procedure.” This would “punish crime in accordance with law, respect and safeguard human rights, increase the credibility of the judicial system, and uphold social fairness and justice.” Though a tall order indeed, the candid recognition of the failings of the criminal justice system revealed in the 15 articles that followed and their specific recommendations for improvement certainly suggested the seriousness with which China’s most authoritative legal institution viewed the situation.

To be sure, the provisions, which apply to the police and the procuracy as well as the courts, “merely” reaffirm the basic protections of suspects and the accused already enshrined in China’s constitution and legislation and reiterated in the SPC campaign documents of the preceding months. But their specific recommendations go beyond the recitation of relevant norms. Procurators are instructed to be more active in exercising supervision over both investigators and judges. Judges and other officials are given detailed instructions about how to treat defense counsel with greater respect, including the obligation to answer their arguments when writing judicial decisions. Judges are also warned that they must not allow the pressures of public opinion, official “stability maintenance,” aggressive litigants or evaluation of their performance in terms of the number of cases handled, conviction rates or deadlines to distort their judgments. Prison officials are required not to withhold inmate petitions from the courts.

The provisions emphasize holding judges and other legal officials “accountable for life” for their illegal actions and require the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for pursuing those responsible and subjecting them to severe sanctions, including criminal punishment.

Perhaps most difficult to implement will be the principles set forth in the last of the provisions, which seeks to terminate or dramatically reduce the control of local party political-legal committees over court judgments. It orders the local committees to “support the independent and fair exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers by the people’s courts and people’s procuracies.” The court, the procuracy and the police are each supposed to work “in an independently responsible and coordinated manner in accordance with the constitution and laws.” The meaning of this phrase is clarified by the final words of the provision, which state that, when “coordinating” the opinions of the courts and other law enforcement units regarding individual cases, the local party political-legal committee should “generally refrain from giving specific opinions regarding the determination or substantive handling of the case.”

Not surprisingly, scattered and preliminary reports about the extent to which this last provision is being implemented suggest that local CPLC subordinates may not be complying with its spirit. Plainly, if China’s courts are ever to move toward meaningful judicial independence, implementation of this provision will be critical. Yet, although SPC leaders have repeatedly advocated, and begun to implement, greater transparency and openness for the court system, they are unlikely to ventilate this crucial but most sensitive aspect of judicial affairs. Moreover, transparency might prove embarrassing to both party leaders and the SPC by providing further proof that, even in a Leninist party-state, the center’s writ can sometimes be ignored.

Issuance of the provisions in August 2013 did not stem the flow of legal documents concerned with wrongful convictions. The Supreme People’s Procuracy joined the bandwagon in September, and the SPC then promulgated two major, detailed documents.

The first of these, issued Oct. 28, renewed the campaign’s basic theme of independent exercise of judicial power in accordance with law to improve the quality of adjudication, but it featured two aspects that had not recently received much attention. It mandated doubling the number of lay “people’s assessors” to take part in the judicial process in order to demonstrate the “democratic” nature of the courts. It also cryptically called for “deepening reform” of the court’s adjudication procedures, a veiled reference to the controversial topic of reforming the scope, powers and procedures of the court’s adjudication committee, which is widely seen as unduly and arbitrarily dominating court decision-making.

The second recent SPC document, specifically focused on “preventing unjust, false and wrongly decided cases,” was issued Nov. 21, shortly after the important decision of the third plenary session of the party’s 18th central committee. In a brief section on promoting the rule of law, the plenum decision emphasized protecting the people’s rights by “upholding the constitution and laws,” assuring independence and fairness in courts, introducing greater judicial transparency and boosting the judicial system to safeguard human rights and avoid false accusations and confessions induced by torture. These slogans were welcome symbols reflecting the party leadership’s continuing endorsement of the SPC’s struggle for court reform. The decision’s references to the constitution and judicial independence were especially useful in opposing an intense campaign by “leftist” ideologues to ban public and academic discussion of these topics.

The coast was now clear for the SPC’s most recent instructions, a long accumulation of the strictures laid down by preceding documents. Its most distinctive feature was an emphasis on “open trials” that “make courtroom hearings the center of the trial” so that “evidence is investigated in the courtroom, conviction and sentencing debated in the courtroom and the court’s judgment shaped in the courtroom.” With one exception, it mandated that evidence that has not been verified in court must not serve as a basis for conviction; only when in-court examination of evidence secretly obtained through “technical measures” might endanger relevant persons or “cause other serious consequences” could a court review it outside the courtroom.

The forthcoming trials of Xu Zhiyong and other recently persecuted human rights advocates, now the topic of fierce intra-party debate, will provide an early test of how the new emphasis on open trials will be applied in practice.

The SPC’s Nov. 21 document is also interesting for its mention of the courts’ relations with other institutions. With no exceptions, the courts are prohibited from jointly deciding cases together with the police and the procuracy. Yet, after again warning judges not to yield to local pressures, the document suggests that, “in significant, difficult or complicated cases,” they may invite local legislators, members of the local people’s consultative conference and other community representatives to observe the trial. The purpose presumably is to provide a desired popular check upon judicial conduct, but, like the duty of the procuracy to scrutinize judicial activity, it is a double-edged sword that expands the temptation for outsiders to interfere with the court’s independent decision-making.

Conclusion

Though it would be premature to draw conclusions regarding China’s newly launched effort to promote a distinctive type of independent judicial decision-making, it is not too early to make a few observations.

First, the Chinese judicial system remains dramatically different from those of any of the world’s liberal democracies. This includes the democracies of Northeast Asia that share China’s Confucian traditions but have more recently been importantly influenced by both continental European and Anglo-American models.

Second, and less discouraging, China’s vast population has increasingly voiced a demand not only for accuracy but also for fairness in the administration of justice as understood in terms of what many in the West would like to consider universal values. China’s new leadership has felt obligated to respond to this demand, despite its continuing and indeed expanding resort to repression. Thus it is seeking to boost popular confidence in the courts through emphasizing consistently reliable implementation of the due process-type procedural reforms increasingly found in Chinese legislation. This requires a judiciary capable of operating with a significant degree of independence from local authorities and other legally distorting influences.

Fortunately, most judges are likely to welcome this renewed emphasis upon judicial professionalism, and their efforts to implement it are buoyed by the active support of a rising group of lawyers seeking to hold the courts to strict compliance with law and procedural safeguards.

What are the chances that this ambitious, yet limited, campaign might succeed? Like the daunting objectives confronting the regime listed at the outset of this essay, it is unclear whether this new goal of a Chinese version of independent adjudication should be characterized as Promethean—that is, extremely challenging but feasible for a regime that has proved itself capable of extraordinary achievements—or Sisyphean.

China is a vast country with a huge population. The problems of effectively operating a national judicial system on such a scale are far greater than comparable ones in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, long before the advent of communism, local Chinese elites had developed the art of frustrating the plans and officials emanating from the capital. Their familiar motto was, “Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away!”

Nevertheless, since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese legal modernizers have come a long way. China’s judicial personnel appear capable of implementing the recently articulated goal. The key question is whether the party’s highest leaders—surprisingly, Zhou was not made a Politburo member—are willing to give this goal a priority it has never before enjoyed and pay the political costs involved in attaining it.

Xi Jinping’s most recent speech, given on Jan. 7, 2014, to the central conference on political-legal work, reaffirmed his support for trial-level judicial independence and a new balance between the party and the courts as an important part of necessary political reforms. Xi also made clear that, unlike his predecessor, he will personally lead the political-legal system, thereby consolidating his power.

Almost a decade ago, the last reformer to occupy the SPC president’s chair, Xiao Yang, sought to enhance the independence of local courts from local authorities by raising the powers to appoint local judges and finance their courts to the central, or at least provincial, level. Those reforms, although begun, have yet to be completed. Will the new effort fare any better? Much will depend on Xi Jinping.

華爾街日報(Wall Street Journal)2014年1月20日

XU ZHIYONG TO FACE TRIAL IN BEIJING AMID CRACKDOWN ON DISSENT

China is putting a prominent rule-of-law campaigner on trial this week, reinforcing leaders’ harder line on dissent as they try to maintain political control in the face of slowing economy.

Xu Zhiyong will face trial Wednesday in Beijing on charges of disturbing public order, according to his lawyer. The charges stem from a series of protests over corruption and access to education in Beijing last year, which Mr. Xu allegedly helped organize.

Mr. Xu, a legal scholar and a former visiting scholar at Yale University, is the founder of the New Citizens Movement, a loosely organized civic group that advocates for greater rule of law and transparency and more equal access to education. Five other members of the movement are set to stand trial in Beijing later in the week, and all face a maximum of five years in prison, lawyers said.

衛報(The Guardian)2014年1月20日

TRIALS PUT NINE CHINESE ACTIVISTS IN DOCK

Chinese authorities are to try nine activists in the space of three days this week but have refused to hear connected cases together, in what human rights groups and lawyers fear is an attempt to mute the impact of the hearings.

All are believed to be charged with “gathering a crowd to obstruct public order”, an offence that can carry a jail sentence of up to five years. Defence lawyers have been told they will not be given the chance to bring witnesses into court to testify.

The best-known defendant, Xu Zhiyong, will stand trial on Wednesday at Beijing No 1 intermediate people’s court. Xu, a legal scholar, was key to the emergence of the New Citizens Movement, which pressed for social fairness, transparency and the rule of law and drew thousands of sympathisers.

紐約客(The New Yorker)

Evan Osnos:THE TRIAL OF THE CHINESE DREAM

In the summer of 2009, the Chinese edition of Esquire ran a soft, glittery feature called “Chinese Dream.” It asked sixty prominent people of one kind or another—actors, editors, public intellectuals—to explain their hopes for the future. One of them, wearing a high-fashion French-cuff shirt and a skinny tie (and bearing the self-conscious expression of a normal person who has been gussied up for a magazine shoot), was a local legislator and lawyer in his mid-thirties named Xu Zhiyong.

 

國際特赦(Amnesty International)

CHINA: HYPOCRITICAL CRACKDOWN ON ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNERS

The Chinese authorities must immediately release prominent activist Xu Zhiyong, whose trial is due to start in Beijing on Wednesday, Amnesty International said.

Xu Zhiyong wrote an article in May 2012, titled China Needs a New Citizens’ Movement, which is credited with spurring a loose network of activists who aim to promote government transparency and expose corruption.

Several other activists are also due to be tried later this week in connection with the New Citizens Movement.

“Instead of President Xi Jinping’s promised clamp-down on corruption, we are seeing a crackdown against those that want to expose it. The persecution of activists associated with the New Citizens Movement has to end,” said Roseann Rife, East Asia Research Director at Amnesty International.

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呼籲釋放姚文田、伊力哈木

22/1/2014 [德國之聲DW] 計畫出版《中國教父習近平》 晨鐘老闆“失蹤”

香港新世紀出版社發行,該社社長鮑樸對德國之聲表示,”姚文田先生的事情,我從媒體報導來看,很有可能又是一個例證,在一本書還沒有出版的情況下,幹預一本書在香港的出版,這是直接違反一國兩制的精神。”鮑樸表示,北京當局一向對香港出版的所謂”政治性有害讀物”採取封殺政策,近年來力度更是有所增強:”從去年5月份開始有一個’香港政治性有害出版物專項行動’,這是宣傳部一直發到基層宣傳部門的一個通知。而且這個專項行動裡面,至少有四批’政治性有害出版物’出版社和出版物名稱。”據鮑樸表示,他本人負責的新世紀出版社以及姚文田的晨鐘書局都名列中國宣傳部門的這四份”黑名單”之中。查閱中國各地政府官方網站也可見大量相關內容,其中包括各地黨委向當地旅遊業主管部門下發指示,要求旅遊從業人員”加強對領隊人員的教育管理”,領隊人員在行程中”引導出境旅客不要購買香港政治性出版物”。另外,也有地方將查處香港政治性出版物的行動歸入”掃黃打非”一項。

姚文田(左);程翔(右)(互聯網)
22/1/2014 [參與] 緊急呼籲:釋放晨鐘書局總編輯姚文田,捍衛香港新聞出版自由

姚文田先生是73歲的老人,患有嚴重的心臟病,據說在拘押期間多次陷入昏迷送醫搶救,現正在拘留所的醫院進行監視醫護。以姚文田先生的年齡和身體狀況,若繼續長期拘押乃至被判有罪關進監獄,必將危及他的生命。在此,我們特發出緊急呼籲,呼籲國際社會和各界善心人士密切關注姚文田,強烈要求當局立即釋放姚文田。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 香港出版商被扣押深圳 疑遭誘捕

在美國的中國流亡作家余傑,週二向本台表示,姚文田最近正在和他商談出版《中國教父習近平》一書。餘傑週二告訴本台記者,相信當局是因姚文田長期出版敏感刊物,而對他進行抓捕:他的太太還沒有答應對外公佈,我現在正在跟姚先生的兒子姚勇戰討論看看他能不能說服他母親(公佈事件)。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 伊力哈木被拘6日無消息 律師將函警方

伊力哈木代表律師李方平表示,外交部說他被刑拘,根據法律規定,被刑拘要通知家屬,正常來說,該通知書會送到長期居住的直系親屬,即他的妻子那裡。他又指,稍後跟家屬交流後,將致函新疆警方,亦會致函北京巿公安局,如沒有答覆,或會到新疆瞭解。他說:現在我們還要去函,我們準備跟她(古再努爾)交流完去函,然後(若果)都不作回覆,我們可能要安排(新疆)行程。北京巿我們也要去函,因為北京方面,他們是口頭答覆。此外,《維吾爾線上》引述學生指出,伊力哈木被帶走同一天,數名學生被帶去審問,其中包括中央民族大學學生瑪利亞姆古麗、阿提開木.肉孜(又名阿提克木.如孜)、阿布杜凱尤木.阿卜力米提、栢爾哈提.哈力木拉提,阿卜杜米吉提.吉勒力,此外,人民大學在讀研究生肖合來提亦在上週三(15日)被傳喚。兩日後即週五,民大上屆畢業生迪力夏提與朋友失去聯繫,至今沒有消息。肖合來提及栢爾哈提.哈力木拉提失蹤,手機仍然關機。維吾爾留學生穆塔力浦.伊明被叫到洛浦縣公安局,之後失去聯絡。古再努爾亦指,據知,丈夫被帶走的同一天,約八名維吾爾族學生被傳喚,至今四人未有消息。其中有阿提克木.如孜,她曾為護照事件維權,阿提克木在上週三被傳喚至晚上一度獲釋,翌日她與另一女學生前來探望,但員警不准進入,她返回宿舍後,翌日即上週五再被警方帶走,至今沒有消息。另一名學生栢爾哈提.哈力木拉提,去年去土耳其但在北京機場被警方扣查。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 伊力哈木妻子發表兩項聲明

 

1月15號被警方抓捕的北京中央民族大學維族學者伊力哈木•土赫提的妻子古再努爾20號發表兩項聲明,一是他們還沒有決定聘請哪位元元元律師代理伊力哈木一案,二是希望當局儘快釋放被抓的四名維族學生。古再努爾告訴本台維語部說,現在已經有多名律師,包括李方平、謝燕益等律師,甚至還有外國律師,提出希望替伊力哈木辯護,但是家人還沒有決定聘請哪一位。所以早先一些媒體報導家人已經聘請律師的消息是不準確的。另外,古再努爾說,伊力哈木被捕後,民族大學有六名維族學生也被公安帶走,其中兩人已經獲釋,還有四人沒有消息。古再努爾說,她很擔心警方的行為會影響到這些學生今後的命運,呼籲當局早日釋放他們回家繼續學業。古再努爾說,伊力哈木的母親現已回到新疆,但是病情惡化。她患有心臟病、高血壓等。先前有報導說,伊力哈木被捕時,他母親不在現場。古再努爾說,其實他母親一直都在家。

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西藏持續受到打壓迫害

22/1/2014 [唯色博客] 被捕47天的堪布尕瑪才旺在被捕前一月的記錄

他應信眾邀請去主持鄉間法會,因要經過對待藏人尤其對待僧侶非常殘酷的昌都類烏齊縣東幹唐檢查站,不得已放棄乘車前往,而徒步翻越雪山。這篇文字記錄了無數藏人在自己的家鄉如此困難的境遇。

22/1/2014 [西藏之聲VOT] 人權觀察:中共在西藏持續實施壓迫性政策

人權觀察於今天(1月21日)發佈共有667頁的《全球年度報告(2014)》,譴責中國共產黨在西藏等少數民族地區持續實施壓迫性政策,並通過強硬的措施和論述持續鞏固其壟斷權力,搗碎外界對中國新領導班子可能深化體制改革以改善人權、強化法治的期望。人權觀察在這份報告中檢視了90多個國家的人權實踐。有關西藏方面,報告指出,中共政府在西藏,長期部署大量安全部隊,嚴格限制藏人遷徒,並將黨的幹部派駐到每一個村莊以加強監視居民。而在新疆,普遍的民族歧視和嚴厲的宗教壓制導致緊張日益升高。超過一百名維吾爾人、漢人和其他民族人士在各地衝突事件中遇害,造成自2009年烏魯木齊暴動以來最高的死亡人數。人權觀察還指出,在西藏和新疆兩地,中國政府都曾向和平示威群眾發射實彈導致傷亡。在這兩個地區,中國政府也都在實施非自願性的人口重新安置和大規模住房改造。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 西藏墨竹工卡縣前政治犯受差別對待

西藏拉薩市墨竹工卡縣的前政治犯遭受當局的差別對待,身份證均被沒收,未經許可不准離開本縣;而墨竹工卡縣甲瑪公安檢查站嚴查進入拉薩的車輛和行人,未持身份證者均被禁止前行。

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宗教研討、維權經歷及聲援行動

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] “對華援助協會”將舉辦中國宗教自由和法治研討會

傅希秋表示:近期,北京等大城市,河南、黑龍江、安徽、陝西等地,都出現了教會被大規模迫害的現象。北京的守望教會購買的聚會場所被封,該教會已經三年沒有室內聚會的場所,一百多位教友因為露天聚會被逮捕。河南南樂“三自”教會的教產被政府侵佔,牧師和同工被逮捕,又說明中共對宗教的迫害,已經從迫害家庭教會,擴展到只要對《聖經》有真誠信仰的哪怕是“三自”教會也不放過。傅希秋說:“張少傑牧師,他是河南省南樂縣‘三自’愛國運動委員會的主席,是縣的政協委員,竟然被當局用非法手段綁架、逮捕、抄家,並且把二十幾個同工都抓捕了。當局採取這樣的手段,把自己扶植起來的宗教傀儡‘三自’教會一窩端,這不是一個單獨的案例,我想這是一個指標性的事件。”

22/1/2014 [參與] 馮正虎親歷維權(圖)

《親歷維權》一書記載馮正虎從2000年至2013年的親身經歷,反映中國人權狀況及維權民眾的抗爭紀實。本書約33萬字,分六個篇章:1. 誰之罪;2. 囹圄磨礪;3. 投身維權;4. 關注訪民;5. 遭遇員警;6. 失去人身自由。這些活生生的荒唐故事發生在國際大都市的上海,經濟開放、繁榮的上海隱藏著司法落後、人權黑暗,市民與權貴利益集團抗爭的血淚史。

 

22/1/2014 [權利運動]

上海300多位維權人士為劉曉波寄明信賀卡

春節即將來臨,上海300多維權人士為被判重刑的諾貝爾和平獎得主劉曉波寄明信賀卡,寄去了上海人民對劉曉波的祝福,祝劉曉波身體健康,節日過得快樂。強烈要求政府釋放劉曉波,停止對劉霞的迫害,還劉霞自由!

22/1/2014 [民生觀察] 武漢網友為“赤壁四君子”送溫暖

昨天上午(1月21日),武漢網友姜正秋乘坐早上八點半的長途汽車趕到嘉魚縣看守所,為袁小華、黃文勳、袁奉初等“赤壁四君子”送錢送物。姜師傅說,武漢網友李文嬋女士為黃文勳、袁奉初、袁小華等人準備了一大包過冬衣物,有毛衣、秋衣秋褲、手套、毛巾等物品。李文嬋一大早不到六點鐘就摸黑出門,坐了兩個小時的車從她漢口的家中趕到武昌的長途車站,把衣服交給姜師傅讓他帶給在獄中的良心犯朋友們。姜師傅收到李文嬋送來的衣物後十分感動,他為網友們的這份守望真情而感慨萬千。隨後,薑正秋乘車從武昌趕去赤壁市嘉魚看守所,路上還是十分順利的。在他到了嘉魚縣城後,姜師傅很快就找到關押良心犯的看守所。十一點四十分左右,薑正秋就把1000元錢(網友捐款)存上,衣服送進去,辦好了所有的事情,順利返回武漢 。

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訪民訴冤及關押黑監獄的暴力事件

22/1/2014 [六四天網] 河北今天開審500農民癱瘓國道案 18人上庭

今天上午8時許,石家莊中級法院將開庭審理劉連江、張宗國等18農民維權代表案【河北一村莊18訪民下周開審 另通緝30多人】。此次審判主要是打壓500村民集體上訪【河北阻500農民挺進北京 國道107癱瘓】。而我們上訪的主要原因是:1.2012年村委會換屆選舉時,向村民發放賄金幾十萬,我們可以可以作證。2.偽造村民代表簽名騙取土地審批,通過市政府徵用我村240多畝土地,偽造所征地的類別,把耕地說成園地和未利用地.土地被徵用後至今未擴建.將耕地閒置擱慌。3、以新民居建設為名搞開發,2010年以20多萬元不等的價格,租村民基本農田50多畝,並建成部分普通樓房和部分300平米左右的高級別墅出售,騙取國家對新民居建設的補助。而起訴書稱:經查明2012年12月份至2013年5月,被告人劉連江,張宗國,劉志超,胡門樓等人經預謀後,以信訪為由多次糾集新樂市何家莊村的村民故意滋事,以達到擴大影響向政府施壓的目的,借機實現不法企圖。起訴書還稱:本案由公安局偵查終結,以被告人。劉連江、張宗國,劉志超,胡門樓,李進朝,李書輝,李令申,楊勤欣 ,李占民,李建設,張青山,張振傑涉嫌尋釁滋事罪。李進府,韓振軍,劉輝,祖振坡涉嫌尋釁滋事,聚眾擾亂交通秩序,李軍征聚眾擾亂交通秩序罪向本院審查起訴。

22/1/2014 [六四天網] 湖北塗應昌、劉華瓊11訪民北京遭攔截關押

2014年1月20日夜12時,湖北襄陽接訪人員從馬家樓截訪強行帶走的李有意、塗應昌、詹福姐、徐春秀等,目前下落不明。而在今天下午15時18分湖北襄陽訪民谷元安來電稱:谷元安等6人在前門被員警強行帶到派出所。另據湖北恩施訪民譚懷敏【湖北黑監獄伺候1500天 譚育榮40天繡金匾贈送天網】來電,恩施鹹豐訪民劉華瓊被縣教育局非法辭退,多年上訪上告,都被當地官員無理壓制,由於鹹豐縣教育部門害怕劉華瓊繼續向中央有關部門告發揭露恩施州官員腐敗行為,2014年1月13日將其從北京抓走,既沒有給其家人任何消息或手續,也不知道其下落,目前音信杳無,家人求助無門。

22/1/2014 [自由亞洲電台RFA] 中國黑監獄及勞教所搖身掛牌 河南現“非正常上訪訓誡中心”

目前身陷該“中心”的訪民阮開香的丈夫張新忠週二(1月21日)告訴本台,他十天前曾前往探望妻子,但被拒絕:“我們這個月9號去,地方(幹部)不讓進,9號還沒有掛牌,我們照了一些照片,到10號掛了 ,牌子上寫‘正陽縣非正常上訪訓誡中心’,以前是黑監獄,但沒有牌子”

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 張新中:習總的4個決不允許救不了我黑監獄中受煎熬的妻子

我叫張新中,妻子叫阮成葉(又名阮開香),我有一雙兒女,家住河南省 正陽縣雷寨鄉雷寨村前徐41號。我們以前在正陽縣農業局,下屬的園藝場承包了幾十畝土地,辦了一個小農場。一家人安逸而與世無爭的生活,做夢我都不沒想過上訪這條路。但是閉門家中坐,禍從天上來。2000年4月4日早晨,當地政府的計生幹部梁發田帶領幾人突然到我們的農場,說我夫婦超生“第三胎”,強行開走我的四輪拖拉機,又罰款12400元,到了4月9日,就私自將我的四輪拖拉機賣掉。我為了討還一個清白,我們夫婦拋家舍業,開始了漫漫的上訪之路。2000年4月4日,這一天是我十年上訪噩夢的開始。

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 上海法官聚眾嫖娼 白天跟黨走 晚上跟妓走等多圖

上海兩會會場外戒備森嚴,在距離兩會會場千米之外就有三十餘穿制服員警幾十便衣加各區信訪工作人員在會場周邊的幾大路口重兵把守,只要有訪民接近全部被趕上路邊停靠的十餘輛標有“專信X號”字樣的大巴,上海訪民在地鐵站附近打起了橫幅“上海法官聚眾嫖娼,白天跟黨走,晚上跟妓走”支持習總“掃除腐敗,堅決清除害群之馬”最後訪民們全部被趕上大巴,送往府村路500號上海救助管理中心內關押到晚上7時左右釋放。

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 伍立娟:銀行斷友北京維權經歷記實

在2013年即將過去,新年2014即將來臨,過去的一年對伍立娟來說都是一個不尋常的一年,年未12月7號伍立娟在北京馬家樓被省駐京辦姚主任與潛江市駐京辦從景主任雇傭黑保安強制押回潛江市被腐敗政府非法拘留10天,伍立娟出來後沒有休息直接去了北京在新年的第一天再次去了中南海找習總被送馬家樓,伍立娟在馬家樓度過了2014年新的第一天。

 

22/1/2014 [權利運動]

惡霸村長陰魂不散,狐朋狗黨為其效犬馬扣押邢曉慧房屋拆遷款

(2014/1/21)權利運動發佈:天津惡霸村長、人大代表黃雙來晚上帶領打手到村民王國廷家以暴力破壞選舉,結果被王國廷、王複春父子、以及聞訊趕到的村民正當防衛正法後,天津市第一中級法院枉法裁判,目前二審審理後尚未判決。最近,王複春的房屋拆遷款已經轉帳到北辰區雙街鎮政府,共計14萬餘元。王複春的妻子邢曉慧多次到鎮政府,要求落實房屋拆遷補償款,但鎮政府的一個姓周的副鎮長百般刁難,先是要求看守所中的王複春出委託,然而才能夠領取。當律師到看守所會見王複春、並讓王複春寫了委託,但周副鎮長又不認可。當邢曉慧提出領取自己的一半時,周副鎮長居然稱需要王複春的二伯王國瑞的書面同意。

22/1/2014 [權利運動] 康素萍:幕後兇手是誰?!

我在該所被扣押將近30小時,饑寒交迫、帶傷、帶病,那裡好冷,據他們說室外已結冰,當時的我衣衫單薄。該所涉嫌非法限制我的人身自由。2013年11月10日傍晚,我被強行遣返,在遣返途中,也就在剛剛離開興壽派出所還沒有出昌平地界,我就被進京截訪人員之一的一個被西安市雁塔區小寨街道辦事處信訪辦主任張冉尊稱為四哥的男人暴打,右眼差點被打瞎,鼻樑根部及眼睛周圍皮下淤血青紫,軟組織挫傷嚴重,三顆牙齒被打松,嘴巴被打開了花,嘴裡嘴外皮下淤血青紫,軟組織挫傷且伴有流血,胸部被連打7、8拳,疼痛不止呼吸困難,左手差點被掰斷……

22/1/2014 [維權網] 浙江中國民主黨人譚凱被傳喚

元月21日接浙江民主維權人士陳樹慶先生材料反映: 2014年1月20日因“包子事件”被拘留10天和6天的杭州維權人士梁麗婉和朱瑛娣拘留期滿,陳美佳、楊雲彪、湯柳葉等60多位訪民前往位於杭州西北郊區的市拘留所迎接。因為梁麗婉曾為中國民主黨浙江委員會的譚凱先生介紹過物件,所以懷著感恩之心,昨日早晨七點多一點,譚凱就趕到杭州市拘留所門口要迎接梁麗婉大姐。到了拘留所門口,譚凱看到了大量迎接梁麗婉和朱瑛娣的訪民,以及如臨大敵、戒備森嚴的眾多員警。譚凱在等待期間就與一些熟悉的訪民聊起了天,大家一致認為,這次警方大肆抓捕維權人士,與其說是“習主席,我要吃包子”的事件,還不如說是地方當局找藉口,要在浙江省的“兩會“期間”,通過關押、軟禁民眾維權代表人物,讓進出廟堂裡“人民代表”們愉悅、滿意地體會“沒有人民喊冤、述苦”的“社會和諧與穩定”。八點半左右,不知道從哪個角落突然沖出來杭州市及西湖區的幾個便衣國保,由鄭博帶隊,先將譚凱強行帶到三墩派出所,後輾轉到文新派出所做筆錄,一直到下午三點多才將譚凱釋放。期間,警方著重詢問了兩個問題:一、今天這麼多訪民到拘留所來迎接梁麗婉和朱瑛娣,是不是譚凱你組織的;二、譚凱在博訊上發表的《從浙大副校長禇健被捕看國進民退》一文,是否代表中國民主黨浙江委員會已經關注民營企業家的維權及企業改制的深層次問題。

22/1/2014 [維權網] 杭州又有兩名“包子事件”受難者期滿獲釋(圖)

因1月8日在杭州市政府門前打“習主席,我想吃包子”橫幅而被行政拘留的裘玉梅和章金火於(今天)1月21日上午9點30分從杭州拘留所獲釋,至此,杭州“包子事件”受難者全部獲釋。朱瑛娣、梁麗婉昨天獲釋後,今天又不辭辛苦地和其他訪民60多人來迎接戰友出獄。

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政經揭秘

22/1/2014 [ICIJ] 機密檔披露中國精英的海外資產

兩萬多名中國內地及香港投資者在避稅天堂註冊公司。美國一家獨立新聞群組織取得的機密檔案和資料庫顯示,中國高層領導的近親在加勒比海避稅天堂持有隱秘的離岸公司,有助中共精英在海外隱藏巨額財富。這些檔包括國家主席習近平的姐夫在海外與他人合夥的地產公司註冊資料,以及前國務院總理溫家寶的兒子、女婿註冊的BVI(英屬維京群島)公司。

<p>Tim Meko</p>

22/1/2014 [Globalmail] China’s Elite Master the Secret Offshore Cash Stash

China’s rich and powerful are big players in the offshore havens that peddle secrecy and tax shelters.

22/1/2014 [ICIJ] Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite

Files shed light on nearly 22,000 tax haven clients from Hong Kong and mainland China.

 

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